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Nontechnical Summary
The Olympic Games usually involve substantial infrastructure investment and boost tourism to the host country. Therefore, the economic impact of the Olympic Games usually receives broad public alertness. However, a full evaluation of this economic impact is rather difficult, since such a mega event has short term and long term, as well as direct and indirect effects, which complicates the estimation of its costs and benefits.
Stock market provides an alternative way of evaluating the economic impact of Olympic Games.
The stock market, a barometer of the economy, is commonly believed to reflect the expectations for the economic outlook. Mega sports events are usually perceived to positively affect the host countries' economy. Hence, the announcement of the host city by the International Olympic Committee should result in a positive reaction of the stock market of the country which is awarded the sports event ("winner country") and in a negative one in those of their unsuccessful competitors ("losing countries").
This paper studies the stock market reactions to the announcement of the Olympic Games host cities during the last three decades. We find a significant and positive announcement effect of hosting the Summer Games which is reflected in the returns (additional 2 percent cumulated over the following days). We do not find any significant results for the Winter Games. Neither do we detect a significant impact when bidders lose the competition. Our results differ from those of a similar study by Mirman and Sharma (2008) , who find that the Winter Games are subject to a significantly negative announcement impact, while the Summer Games are not. Our results, however, rely on a larger sample of 15 Olympic events and are obtained by assessing the observed returns after the announcement against a "business-as-usual" situation (instead of testing the difference between the winner group and the loser group).
Our findings are in line with economic intuition, since the Summer Games are larger than the Winter Games and are thus more likely to have a significant impact. We also find that among the winners, small economies tend to have greater cumulative abnormal returns than their large peers. To assess the economic impact of the Olympic Games expected by market participants, Mirman and Sharma (2008) test for the difference between winners and losers. That methodology depends on the chosen group of losers. Indeed, stock market reactions are expected to differ across losing countries with respect to the ex-ante probability of winning the announcement. For example, no negative announcement effects should be expected for those ex-post losers who have very low exante probabilities of winning the competition. Therefore, there will presumably be a difference in the results when comparing the group of the winners to the one of the losers if the latter is composed by all losing cities or only by those with the highest ex-ante winning probability. We circumvent this difficulty by testing the abnormal returns of winning and losing countries separately. That is,
we assess the economic impact by comparing the market reactions after a (positive or negative)
IOC announcement with the "business-as-usual" situation. We also consider a group of "first losers" (those ranked in the second place in the last round of the competition). The ex-post ranking of IOC voting results are used as a proxy for the ex-ante probability of winning the competition.
First losers are expected to be affected by the negative news of the IOC decision in a stronger way than the other losers.
On the basis of a more comprehensive data set than used before (15 Summer Games or Winter Games), we find insignificant overall results for the Winter Games. In contrast, for the successful applicant for the Summer Games, we find positive and significant results. Yet we do not find sig- , markets might not react clearly enough to indicate a significant impact. Based on a cross sectional analysis of all Olympic host cities, the abnormal returns after the announcement tend to be higher in small economies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the event study methodology applied in our paper. Section 3 reports the empirical results of our investigation.
Section 4 concludes.
Methodology
MacKinlay's (1997) event study methodology provides a frequently applied framework to identify abnormal returns which are triggered by surprising upcoming information in the stock market.
In order to disentangle abnormal returns from usual fluctuations in the stock market, the market model makes use of the statistical relationship between a market portfolio (represented by, e.g., a national stock market index) and the considered security. The present analysis uses a market model given by
where R it represents the log-return of market i (measured by the national stock indices) and R mt the log-return of the world portfolio. Assuming that these coefficients are stable over time, the abnormal returns for the event window can be computed by AR iτ = R iτ −α i −β i R mτ , where AR iτ denotes the abnormal returns of market i at point τ during the event window.
The assessment of overall market reactions to an IOC decision announcement needs to be based on several observations. First the observations are grouped according to their properties (e.g.
winning/loosing cities). Within each group of interest, the average cumulated abnormal returns can be computed by
where CAR i (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is the cumulated abnormal returns of a single event. Since these have the asymptotic variance σ
, the total variance of the average cumulated abnormal returns can be computed by
The null hypothesis that the cumulated abnormal returns are equal to zero can then be tested by the
Empirical Results
Information about candidacies for hosting the Olympic Games can be obtained from www.olympic.org.
It is important to note that this source only includes the countries which were still participating in the competition at the announcement date. Since it is unlikely that the stock market is affected in countries which have had to leave the selection process at an earlier stage, they are excluded from the analysis. We also exclude Yugoslavia (announcement in 1986 and 1990) , Bulgaria (1986 Bulgaria ( ,1988 and Sweden (1981) , whose stock market indices were unavailable in the announcement year. The ex-post information about the IOC voting results is used as a proxy for the ex-ante probability of winning the competition, creating a subgroup of "first losers". These countries are assumed to be affected by the negative news of the IOC decision in a stronger way than the other losers. For each country in the sample, we take the main stock market index as a measure for the entire domestic . This is especially true for the Olympic Summer Games, whereas the effect cannot be found to be significant if only the Olympic Winter Games are considered. As Table I shows, these results apply irrespective of whether the event window is chosen to be [
. Our results are in line with economic intuition: Domestic corporations in the host country are expected to take advantage of the substantial public and private spending in the years prior to a mega sports event. Since the budget and public interest for the Olympic Summer Games typically exceed that for the Winter Games, the stock market reaction is expected to be stronger for Summer Games.
An opposite reasoning can be made for the unsuccessful candidate cities. Before the IOC has announced its decision, the impact of the Olympic Games was incorporated (weighted with a probability) in the stock prices. Since the final IOC decision means for these countries that public spending on infrastructure due to Olympics will not occur, investors have to reassess the value of the domestic corporations. This effect might be particularly large if the loosing city was attributed a high ex-ante probability of being awarded the Olympic Games. Therefore, besides the entire group of losers, we consider a group of "first losers" of each announcement 9 . The computation for the entire group of losers brings an additional complication: multiple losers of the same announcement create cross correlation in returns which violates the underlying zero covariance assumption in 6 See http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/ for details. 7 The event window included the day when the IOC announcement was first absorbed by the market as well as the subsequent n = τ 2 − τ 1 trading days. Since the IOC announcement is typically made in the evening (local time), we accounted for the trading hours of the respective stock exchanges by starting the event window at the subsequent trading day unless time zone effects allowed the information to enter the stock exchange on the announcement day itself.Equation (3) (see MacKinlay 1997). Therefore we build portfolios of losers for each event to perform the test over the sample of portfolios 10 . Both for all losers as well as for the first losers, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns for all considered event windows.
Intuitively, the variation in the cumulative abnormal return at the announcement date might partly be explained by the size of the economy of the candidates. To test this hypothesis, we regress cumulative abnormal returns (CAR i ) on the size of the economy (with OLS, using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors). The size variable is taken as the percentage of the individual country GDP relative to the world GDP in the announcement year. Since only winners have significant abnormal returns, we restrict our regression analysis to this subgroup. Table II reports the results. The size of the winner negatively and significantly relates to its cumulative abnormal return. This is consistent with the intuition that winning the bid to host the Olympic Games is expected to have a relatively larger economic impact for small economies than for large ones. This result continues to hold true if we include a dummy variable for the Summer Games.
Conclusion
We investigate stock market reactions to the IOC announcement of the city hosting the Olympic Games. Based on an event-study methodology, the abnormal returns after the announcements indicate a significantly positive effect of hosting the Olympic Summer Games. This effect is negatively related to the size of the economy of the winning country. Since stock markets are assumed to reflect the expectations about the economic outlook, the Olympic Summer Games are considered to have a positive impact on the economy of the host countries. Note: This table reports the average cumulated abnormal returns CAR, the corresponding standard errors and the t-statistics for the subgroups of the winners, the losers and the first losers. The analysis is performed for the Winter Games, the Summer Games, and both jointly. Abnormal returns are computed on the basis of the market model R it = α i + β i R mt + it , where the parameters are obtained from the estimation window [−241, −41] . Various event windows are reported. The average cumulated abnormal returns across all observations is computed by Note: The equation CAR i = a + b 1 S hareGDP i + i corresponds to Model(1), whereas an additional dummy for the Summer Games is included into Model(2). The estimates are obtained with OLS, and the heteroscedasticityrobust standard errors are given in parentheses below. Significance levels: * = 10%, * * = 5%, * * * = 1%.
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